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1. Introduction 
The management of migration is one of the most topical issues in current world affairs. The keen 
interest in migration policy has lead to a strand of economics literature on how migration policies 
are formed. Ethier (1986), Bond and Chen (1987), and Djajic (1989) were among the first scholars 
who studied specifically the management of migration inflows by the receiving countries. More 
recent contributions have been made, among others, by Woodland and Yoshida (2006), Benhabib 
and Jovanovic (2007), and Bianchi (2010).
1
In this paper, we contribute to the research on the management of international migration by 
developing substantially the model of Stark and Wang (2002). In that model, the level of human 
capital of migrants and non-migrants alike is affected by the migration policy. We relax two of the 
key assumptions of Stark and Wang (2002): that the sending country alone wields the power to set 
the migration policy; and that the policy can be implemented costlessly. These assumptions do not 
seem to tally with a reality in which quite often neither the sending country nor the receiving 
country fully controls migration, and does so at no cost. To this end, we develop a two-country 
framework in which in terms of their level of human capital, workers within each country are ex 
ante (that is, prior to migration) homogeneous. We study how migration policies are determined 
when both countries wield power to set migration policies, and when controlling migration is 
costly. The policy instrument that we employ is a migration quota which, for a given number of 
workers in the sending country, corresponds to a  probability of migration.
  The received writings share the  feature  that  the 
“quality” of each potential migrant, in particular his endowment of human capital, is taken as given 
and is orthogonal to (not determined endogenously by) the migration policy. This assumption does 
not seem to fit with a recent and fast evolving literature that maintains that under well specified 
conditions, the migration of human capital from a developing (sending) country to a developed 
(receiving) country enhances human capital formation and raises welfare within the sending country 
(Stark and Wang, 2002; Fan and Stark, 2007a, 2007b; Sorger, Stark, and Wang, 2011). We contend 
that the formation of migration policies should better not be oblivious to the endogeneity of the 
human capital decision and to the dependence of that decision on those policies. 
2
                                                 
1 There is also a growing literature on the political economy of the determination of immigration quotas. The focus in 
that literature is on the perspective of the receiving countries. Examples are Benhabib (1996), Facchini and Willmann 
(2005), and Ortega (2005). Razin et al. (2011) study migration policy restrictions in political-economic models when 
the destination country is a welfare state. 
  We model the 
2 While receiving countries have lately focused on the development of screening policies in order to affect the skill-mix 
of the migrant inflow, migration quotas are also common. A striking example of a migration quota is the Green Card 
Lottery in the United States (United States Immigration Support, 2011). Every year, the United States issues 50,000 
Green Cards through the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, which allocates visas randomly to prospective migrants on 
the basis of a computer-generated draw. Migration quotas are also common in EU countries. Boeri and Bruecker (2005)   2 
interaction between the two countries, first as a simultaneous non-cooperative game, and second as 
a sequential non-cooperative game. We also consider the endogenous emergence of bilateral 
agreements between countries.
3
We find that, in equilibrium, both the sending country and the receiving country can set the 
migration policy. We also find that bilateral agreements can arise as a welfare-improving 
mechanism. In addition, we show that the sending country can gain from migration even when the 
receiving country plays an active role in setting the migration policy, and when implementing that 
policy is costly. 
 We do so in two alternative settings: first, when the country that 
does not set the migration probability can nonetheless influence the equilibrium migration policy by 
resorting to the device of side-payments, which take the form of transfers for the support of control 
activities (say, funds for border enforcement); and second, when the two countries (Nash) bargain 
over the migration policy and over the sharing of the costs of implementing the policy. 
Section 2 presents the benchmark model. Section 3 introduces the migration policy and 
establishes the equilibrium migration quota for a simultaneous game and a sequential game. Section 
4 discusses bilateral agreements. Section 5 assesses whether under the equilibrium migration policy, 
the welfare of the sending country improves in comparison with the “no migration” situation. 
Section 6 presents conclusions. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
provide evidence of restrictions imposed by the old Member States on citizens of the new Member States during the 
transitional period in the wake of the two latest enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007. Restrictions applying to citizens 
of non-EU countries are also widespread, as documented, for example, by the ILO (2004). These restrictions are often 
specific to certain sectors (agriculture in Austria, France, Greece, Portugal, and Sweden; tourism in Austria; and mining 
in France, Greece, and Portugal). Several receiving countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Spain, and Switzerland) 
distinguish quotas according to the country of origin of the migrants, and on the basis of bilateral agreements. Several 
sending countries (including China) restrict issuing passports or granting exit visas so as to prevent (some of) their 
citizens from leaving. In China, in spite of a significant relaxation of migration controls in recent years, permission to 
leave the country may not be granted to those whose departure will, in the opinion of the competent department, be 
harmful to state security or cause major damage to national interests (cf. the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens, 1986). More generally, the perception that it is the receiving countries that 
control incoming migration (“fix the migration policy”) rather than the sending countries is often a myth. Spain has 
been at pains to forge an agreement with Senegal such that Senegal will curtail illegal migration to Spain, with Spain 
offering in exchange development aid and other financial incentives. Senegal will be allowed to grant a limited number 
of permits for Senegalese to work in Spain, and will otherwise exercise strict control over departures and cooperate 
fully in a swift repatriation of illegal migrants. (Similar pacts were made by Spain with Mauritania and with Morocco, 
for example.) Italy has had a similar agreement with Libya. The EU has been going out of its way to get sending 
countries in Africa to clamp down on EU-bound migration. The current (2011) preliminary talks between the EU and 
Tunisia’s interim government on an agreement that will grant Tunisia preferential trade in return for a commitment to 
curb “irregular migration” is another illustration of the say that the sending country has in regulating migration flows. 
The US has long sought to have the Mexican government cap US-bound migration, essentially admitting that Mexico is 
as much in control of (illegal) migration to the US as is the US itself. Even in security-conscious Israel, it is Sudan 
rather than Israel that for the past few years has determined the (illegal) flow to Israel (via Egypt and the Sinai 
Peninsula) of thousands of its nationals.   
3 Fernandez-Huertas (2008) shows that bilateral agreements can be mutually beneficial for the sending country and the 
receiving country. In his setting, however, the human capital level of each potential migrant is given and is exogenous 
to the migration policy.   3 
2. The model 
In this section, we present our basic model. We draw on, and adjust for our current purposes, the 
model of Stark and Wang (2002). We consider a two-country world where, prior to migration, 
workers within each country are homogeneous. The assumption of a homogeneous workforce in the 
sending country is not critical however for the subsequent derivation of the results reported in the 
paper. In Appendix 1 we show that the equilibrium migration policies obtained in the homogeneous 
workforce setup are unchanged when there are two types of workers. Let  [ ] 0,1 m∈  denote the 
probability that a worker in the sending country S migrates to the receiving country R. 
j N  denotes 
the measure of the continuum of homogeneous workers in country  R S j , = . Workers produce a 
single commodity, the price of which is normalized at 1. Labor, measured in efficiency units, is the 
only factor of production. 
In each country, the decision of workers how much human capital to acquire is undertaken in 
the presence of human capital externalities. Let the gross earnings in country j, 
j f , of a native 
worker depend on the worker’s human capital, 
j ϑ , with a productivity parameter weight of 
j β >0, 
and on the average level of human capital, 
j ϑ , with a productivity parameter weight of  0 > η . 
Thus, 
  ln( 1) ln( 1).
j jj j f β ϑ ηϑ = ++ +   (1) 
In an Appendix available on request, we show that an alternative specification of the earnings 
functions  of workers, based on an  economy modeled along the lines of a CRS Cobb-Douglas 
production technology, yields the same essential results regarding the implications of a prospect of 
migration for human capital formation and for the average level of human capital in the sending 
country as the results obtained and drawn upon below. 
To concentrate on essentials, we assume that the externality parameter η is constant and that it 
is the same in each of the two countries, whereas the private returns to human capital differ between 
countries.
4
                                                 
4 Two features of the earnings function (
 
1) merit comment. First, by including the economy-wide average level of 
human capital, we incorporate a measure of externality that captures spillover effects that accrue within the national 
economy. For a succinct review of evidence on geographical and intertemporal spillover effects of human capital, see 
Moretti (2005). The externality assumption is common in the theoretical literature on endogenous economic growth, 
and it has recently been adopted to address the relationship between migration, human capital accumulation, and growth 
(Fan and Stark, 2007a, Sorger, Stark, and Wang, 2011). Second, the chosen functional form relies on a constant private 
returns parameter. This assumption is employed to facilitate tractability and is taken from Stark and Wang (2002). A 
helpful property of the constant private returns assumption, which is quite valuable for the questions addressed in this   4 
How much human capital to acquire is determined by maximization of the expected net 
earnings, which are equal to the expected gross earnings minus the cost of forming human capital, 
j kϑ , where 0
j k β <<  is a constant. 
For a native worker of S, the objective function is 
  { } { } ( ) ln( 1) ln( 1) (1 ) ln( 1) ln( 1) ,
S S mR S R S S S S Wm m k ϑ β ϑ ηϑ β ϑ ηϑ ϑ = ++ + +− ++ + −   (2) 
where  ( ,
mR S R β β ηβ  ∈+   denotes the private returns to the worker if he is a migrant in R, an event 
which occurs with probability m. The private returns to human capital are higher in R than in S, that 
is, 
RS ββ > ; when countries differ in their technologies, and when technologies are country-
specific, the superior technology of an advanced, developed country renders the application of a 
given level of human capital in that country more productive than in the developing country. The 
assumption 
R mR ββ ≥  allows the productivity of the natives to differ from the productivity of the 
migrants. It also enables us to capture, in a simplified manner, the imperfect transferability of 
human capital between countries. Still, the degree of transferability is assumed to be sufficiently 
large to preserve a positive difference in the private returns to human capital between R and S. The 
assumption 
mR S β βη >+  is discussed further below, following equation (8). To further enable us to 
concentrate on essentials, we assume that migration entails no cost of movement.
5
When workers choose their optimal level of human capital, they take into consideration the 
private returns to human capital and the costs of acquiring human capital, but they do not factor in 
the repercussions of their choices on the productivity of others. This disregard of the externality 
effect of human capital results in underinvestment in human capital from a social point of view. It 
also invites corrective public policy.  
 
Differentiating (2) with respect to 
S ϑ  yields 
 
( ) (1 ) ( )
.
11 1
S S mR S mR S S
SS S S
dW m m m
kk
d
ϑ β β βββ
ϑϑ ϑ ϑ
− −+
= + −= −
++ +
  (3) 
Consequently, the optimal level of human capital of workers in country S is
 6
                                                                                                                                                                  
paper, is that it provides a setting in which migration controls can be used as a “pure” policy instrument to restrict 
migration since in and by itself, migration is not restricted by decreasing marginal returns to human capital at 
destination. 
 
5 Introducing a fixed cost of migration will not affect the individual’s human capital formation decision. 
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=−   (4) 
Given that 
mR S ββ > , for any 01 m <≤  the level of human capital of a worker in S exceeds the 






ϑ = − .
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Referring next to R, since, by construction, workers in R face a probability of migration 
 
0 = m , 
their objective function is 
  ( ) ln( 1) ln( 1)
RR R R R R Wk ϑ β ϑ ηϑ ϑ  = ++ + −  ,  (5) 
and the first order condition for the maximization of their net earnings yields an optimal level of 







∗ = − .  (6) 
From a comparison of (4) and (6), and recalling our assumptions regarding  , , and 
S mR R ββ β , it 
follows that
8 ** SR ϑϑ <   , namely the level of human capital formed in S is lower than the level of 
human capital prevailing in R.
9
This observation is important since, as elucidated momentarily, it points to a drawback, from 
R’s point of view, of R opening its borders to migration from S: the impact of such migration on R’s 
welfare manifests itself through the effect of migration on the average level of human capital in R, 
and this effect is deleterious. 
 
3. Forming a migration policy 
In this section we study the interaction between S and R. In sub-section 3.2 we characterize this 
interaction as a non-cooperative game in which S and R set their optimal policies simultaneously, 
                                                 
7 The socially optimal level of human capital per worker in S in the closed economy setting, that is when m=0, is 







= − , cf. Stark and Wang (2002). There, it is also shown that an appropriately chosen migration policy 
can bring the economy to the social optimum, substituting for human capital subsidies.  
8 When doing so does not cause any confusion, we simplify the writing that follows by dropping the argument in 
*()
S m ϑ . 
9 To see this, note that for  1 m < , and recalling that  mR S ββ > ,  ()
mR S S m βββ − +=   (1 )
mR S mR R mm β ββ β +− < ≤ . For a 
hypothetical  1 m = , 
** SR ϑϑ =  if and only if 
mR R ββ = .   6 
each taking the other’s move as given. In sub-section 3.3 we study a non-cooperative two-stage 
(Stackelberg) game in which one country is the first mover, setting its optimal policy anticipating 
the best reply of the other country. 
As already noted, the policy instrument that we study is setting a migration quota, M. Even 
though countries frequently employ both screening and quotas as migration policy instruments, in 
this paper we study the latter. As noted in the Introduction, quotas are practiced often. For a given 
size, 
S N , of the sending country’s workforce, the setting of a quota M is equivalent to setting a 






Undoubtedly, implementing a restrictive policy is costly. We assume that the cost of 
implementation is a function of the number of individuals that country S (R) wants to let out (in) 
over the total number of potential out-migrants (in-migrants), which in turn represents the migration 
pressure that each country faces. We denote by  ()
j Cm  the cost of migration controls for country j, 
with j=S, R. Taking into account plausible differences between S and R in the technologies of 
control, this cost can well be country-specific. We assume that  ˆ (0) 0,  (1) 0





< , namely,  a  tighter policy  requires a larger financial outlay. Enforcing a closed-
















dm → = , 
namely, as we approach fully open borders, the marginal cost goes to zero. 
It stands to reason that if either of the two countries chooses a migration probability m, the 
probability space of the other is  ] , 0 [ m : in a two-country world, emigration and immigration flows 
must be equal, and once one country chooses a probability level m, the other country cannot choose 
a less restrictive (that is, a higher) probability. We thus assume that the country that fixes the 











                                                 
10 The properties of this cost function are akin to those of the cost function used by Ethier (1986), with the main 
difference being that here we allow for the enforcement of a closed economy policy. 
 
11 However, the assumption that only one country at a time bears the migration control cost is relaxed in Section 4.   7 
The resources required to implement the preferred migration policy are marshaled by levying a 
lump-sum tax on the country’s native workforce. Therefore,  ()
j cm  also denotes the per capita 
lump-sum tax. The assumption of a lump-sum tax implies that the decision to acquire human capital 
is not affected by the tax-based financing of the migration policy.
12
With regard to the choice of the migration policy, we assume that R cares only about the 
wellbeing of its own natives. As to S, its concern rests  with  the non-migrant members of its 
workforce, since the representative migrant worker who ends up subjecting his human capital to the 
 
()
mR S ββ >  productivity parameter (that is, to the superior R country technology) is clearly better 
off than an otherwise identical worker who stays behind in S.
13
 
 The migration policy of country j is 
decided through maximization of the objective function 
* ** ( ) ln( 1) ln( 1) ( ) , j
j j j j jj j
I G m k c mI β ϑ ηϑ ϑ = ++ +− −   (7) 
where  { } 0;1
j I =  is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 when country j fixes the 










=   to denote the 
corresponding objective function.  
Equation (7) displays the net earnings of a representative worker in country j, minus the per 
capita control cost, where the net earnings are evaluated at the optimal level of investment in human 
capital, 
* j ϑ . 
Prior to introducing the simultaneous and sequential game, we make several preliminary 
observations. These are pooled together in the following sub-section. 
                                                 
12 In equations (2) and (5) we did not include the lump-sum tax because at that point of the analysis, we did not as yet 
introduce migration policy choices. Given that the individual takes as given the migration probability m, inclusion of the 
lump-sum tax  ()
j cm  will not affect the first order condition of the individual’s optimization problem, however. 
13 Stark and Wang (2002) discuss the choice of the objective function for the sending country. From Stark and Wang 
(2002) and from our discussion thus far we know that there is a threshold migration probability such that for quotas that 
entail a larger probability, non-migrants are actually worse off than when the quotas are set equal to zero; 
overinvestment in education can be detrimental to wellbeing. In such a case, in the wake of the migration opportunity 
the source economy will experience a reduction of welfare. However, as we show in Section 5, in equilibrium this 
possibility does not materialize.    8 
3.1 Preliminary observations 
Focusing first on country S, we note that its objective function,  S
S
I G , depends on m both via the 
impact of the per capita cost of control, and via the optimal individual level of human capital and 
the average level of human capital. From (7) and (4), the objective function of country S is: 
  ( )
() ()
() l n 1 () , S








   −+ −+
= + − −−   
     (7a) 
which captures  that the government takes into account the externality in human capital 
accumulation and knows that 
** SS ϑϑ = . Differentiating (7a) with respect to m yields 





mR S S I
mR S S







 = − −−
−+  
  (8) 
The first of the two terms on the right hand side of (8) captures the impact that a change in the 
migration probability m has on the earnings of the non-migrants via the change in the individual 
human capital and the average level of human capital. The second term captures the change in 
migration control costs, if incurred. In determining the optimal migration probability for S, we 
distinguish between two cases. If  0







. The assumptions that  0 η >  and that 
mR S β βη >+  ensure that 
* 01
S m << . This 
probability also represents the equilibrium migration policy when S wields the exclusive power to 
set the migration policy, and when policy implementation is costless (cf. Stark and Wang, 2002).  
If  1
S I = , the optimal policy for S is 
** SS
C mm > , where the subscript C stands for incurring the 
control cost.
14 The intuition for this result is straightforward: if migration controls are costly then, 
as already noted, the cost component becomes lower as m becomes larger. It is therefore beneficial 








dm → =  We note that as  , the maximization 
                                                 
14 For a large enough 
* , ( )
SS S





= > . It is this case that we consider 
throughout the present paper. From the convexity of the cost function it follows that the second order condition for a 
maximum holds.  
15 Formally, for 
* S mm = , the bracketed term in (8) is equal to zero, while the term  ()
S dc m
dm
−  is positive. Hence, the 
optimal  m  cannot be equal to 










, which in turn yields an optimal migration probability  ** SS





   9 
problems when  0
S I =   and  1
S I =   coincide as m  approaches 1, and therefore the assumption 
mR S β βη >+  also ensures that 
* S
C m <1. 
Regarding R, its objective function  R
R
I G  depends on m via the per capita cost of control, and via 
the average level of human capital in R, 
* R













 .          (9) 
From (7), the objective function of country R (recalling that for the natives in R their individual 
optimal level of human capital does not depend on the migration opportunities) is thus 
 
* ** ( ) ln( 1) ln( 1) ( ) R
R R R R RR R
I G m k c mI β ϑ ηϑ ϑ = ++ +− −  (7b) 
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.  (11) 
From (11) we can see that migration has two opposite effects on R: a negative average human 
capital diluting effect, and a positive inducement effect. This can be discerned upon considering the 
first line of the right-hand side of (11). A higher m leads to a larger number of migrants (as can be 
gleaned from the first term in the numerator). The average level of human capital of these migrants 
is below the level of human capital formed by workers in R. Yet, a higher probability of migration 
increases the optimal level of human capital that workers in S choose to acquire and migrate with 
(this is the inducement effect, captured by the second term in the numerator). 
If  0
R I = , the migration probability which maximizes (7b) is 0. If  1
R I = , any  [ ] 0,1 m∈  can be 
a solution to the maximization problem, depending on the exogenous parameters  of the cost 
function, and on the degree of transferability of human capital between the two countries. We 
consider the two corner solutions, 0 and 1, uninteresting, unrealistic, and hence we do not dwell on 
them. For an interior solution, 
* (0,1)
R






C I dG m
dm








C I dG m
dm
= < .  Then, 
* R
C m   represents a global maximum if 
*
11 ( ) (1) RR
RR R
C II Gm G
== >   and 
*
11 ( ) (0) RR
RR R
C II Gm G
== > : the first of these two inequalities arises from the limited transferability of 
human capital; the second follows from the assumptions regarding the parameters of the model. 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation.
16
3.2 The simultaneous game 
 
We here characterize the Nash equilibria of the simultaneous one-shot game. The best reply of 
country j is 
 
* ( ) if 0 ( ) ( )
( ( ))
ˆ 0 if ( ) ( ) ,
j j ii i j
ji i C










where i=S, R,  ji ≠ , and with 
j m   such that 
 
*




C m mG m G m
== ==  ,  (13) 
that is, 
j m   is the highest migration probability that equalizes the level of welfare in country j when 
it does not pay any migration control cost with the level of welfare that it achieves when it sets its 
optimal policy and pays the corresponding migration control cost.  
If country i fixes a migration probability 
i m  paying the implied cost  ()
ii cm, the best reply of 
country  j  is to set its optimal policy 
* j
C m   with the corresponding cost 
* ()
jj
C cm   when 
0 () ()
ii i j cm cm ≤<  , that is, when  1
ji mm <≤   and therefore, 
i m  is less restrictive than 
j m  .
17
1
ji mm <≤ 
 This 
holds because in the interval  , 
*
01 () ( ) jj
ji jj
C II GmGm
== < . The best reply of country j is to 
accept the proposed  ()
ii cmif  ˆ () ()









= , that is, if 0
ij mm ≤≤   and country i 
sets a quota that is equal to, or more restrictive than 
j m  . 
                                                 
16 In Figures 1 and 2 we plot  ()
j cm  and  j
j
I G , where the latter is the objective function  j
j
I G  normalized with respect to 








= = − . While this representation is a convenient normalization for the sake of graphical representation, it 
does not affect either the first order conditions that we identified in the preceding text or the Propositions that follow. 
Figures 1 and 2 display  instances  where  an interior global maximum obtains. (In Appendix 2  we provide the 
parameterization that we have used in order to draw the Figures). 
17 The best reply functions are defined over the space 
j c , 
i c . Since the cost function is monotonic and decreasing in m
,  ()
jj cm identifies a unique 
j m  with  , j SR = . It is straightforward to see that if  ( ) ( ')
jj cm cm < , then  ' mm < .   11 
To see why in the interval  ˆ () ()
i j ii i cm cm c ≤≤   accepting  ()
ii cm and not paying any cost is the 
best reply, it is convenient to look separately at country S and at country R. For j=R, the condition 
*
01 () ( ) RR
RR RR
C II GmGm
== =   in (13) identifies a unique 
R m  , given that 
* R
C m  is a global maximum. For 
0,
SR mm  ∈  , 
*
01 () ( ) RR
RS RR
C II GmGm
== ≥ , and the receiving country cannot improve its welfare by 
setting its own preferred policy. For  jS = , condition 
*
01 () ( ) SS
SS SS
C II GmGm
== =    identifies two 
different migration probabilities: 
S m   as in (13), and 
*
01 min{ : ( ) ( )} SS
SS SS
C II
SS m mG m G m − == ==  . The 
interval  0,
S m      can therefore be divided in two sub-intervals:  ) 0,
S m−    ,  and  ,
SS mm −   . For 
,
R SS m mm −  ∈ , it holds that 
*
01 () ( ) SS
SR SS
C II Gm Gm
== ≥ , namely, the sending country is better off, or 
equally well off, by accepting the migration probability proposed by the receiving country 
compared to choosing 
* S
C m . For  ) 0,
RS mm −  ∈  , we note that the sending country will be better off at 
* S
C m . However, it cannot choose a less restrictive migration policy than 
* R
C m , since 
* R
C m  limits the 
space of choice for the sending country. Consequently, the point 
S m−   is irrelevant in the construction 
of the best reply of country S. Figure 1 illustrates 
S m−  , 
S m  , 
R m  . 
The Nash equilibria are identified by the intersection of the two best reply functions 
( ( )), and  ( ( ))
RS S SR R br c m br c m . Each of these functions takes only two values: 0 and 
* ()
RR
C cm  for 
the receiving country, and 0 and 
* ()
SS
C cm  for the sending country, with discontinuity points at 
()
SR cm  , and at  ()
RS cm  , respectively. In establishing the equilibria, we seek to be as general as 
possible and consider all potential orderings of 
* ()
RR
C cm ,  ()
SR cm  , 
* ()
SS
C cm , and  ()
RS cm  .
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Proposition 1: The Nash equilibria of the simultaneous-move game are:  
 We now 




( ),0 if ( ) ( ) and  ( ) ( )
0, ( ) if ( ) ( ) and  ( ) ( )
( ),0  or  0, ( ) if ( ) ( ) and  ( ) ( ).
RR SR SS RS RR
C CC
SS SR SS RS RR
C CC
RR SS SR SS RS RR
CC C C
cm cm cm cm cm
cm cm cm cm cm
cm cm cm cm cm cm
 >≤ 
 ≤> 




   
(14) 
                                                 
18 There are 24 (4!) potential orderings. Six of them are characterized by 
* () ( )
SR SS
C cm cm >   and 
* () ( )
RS RR
C cm cm >  . 
Note that these last two inequalities are mutually exclusive once we take into account that 
* jj
C mm >  . For example, the 
first inequality implies 
* SR
C mm >  , which, recalling that 
** SS RR
CC mm mm > >>  , contradicts 
* SR
C mm <  , a condition that 
follows from the second inequality. The remaining eighteen possible orderings are discussed in Proposition 1.   12 
Proof:  According to (12), the best reply functions can only intersect at 
* ( ),0
RR
C cm     and at 
*  0, ( )
SS
C cm   . If 
** ( ) ( ) and  ( ) ( )
SR SS RS RR
CC cm cm cm cm ≤≤  , the best reply functions intersect twice. 
This happens for six possible orderings of 
* ()
RR
C cm ,  ()
SR cm  , 
* ()
SS
C cm ,  and  ()
RS cm  .  If 
* () ( )
SR SS
C cm cm ≤   but 
* () ( )
RS RR
C cm cm >  , the discontinuity point of the best reply of country S 
()
RS cm   is to the right of the optimal control cost of the receiving country 
* ()
RR
C cm , and the only 
intersection is at 
*  0, ( )
SS
C cm   . Following the same reasoning, if 
* () ( )
RS RR
C cm cm ≤    but 
* () ( )
SR SS
C cm cm >  , the best reply functions only intersect at 
* ( ),0
RR
C cm   .  Each of these three 
different cases is satisfied by six out of the eighteen possible orderings  of 
* ()
RR
C cm ,  ()
SR cm  , 
* ()
SS
C cm , and  ()
RS cm  . 
The first two lines in (14) describe a situation in which the equilibrium is unique and either the 
receiving country or the sending country sets its preferred policy. Consider for example the first 
line: the receiving country sets its preferred policy 
* R
C m  and pays the corresponding cost 
* ()
RR
C cm ; 
the sending country accepts and pays no migration control cost. This is an equilibrium because 
* RS
C mm <  , and the best reply of country S is to accept 
* R
C m . The equilibrium is unique because, if 
the sending country plays 
* S
C m , given that 
* SR
C mm >  , the receiving country will react by setting its 
own preferred policy 
* R
C m , in which case it is optimal for the sending country to accept. In the third 
line, there are two Nash equilibria in which the receiving country and the sending country can be 
the equilibrium migration policy setter: multiple equilibria arise because both 
* R
C m  and 
* S
C m  do not 
exceed the thresholds   and 
SR mm  , respectively, and therefore, the best reaction of each country is to 
accept the preferred policy of the other country. 
For reference in what follows, we note that the optimal migration probability that corresponds 




if ( ) ( ) and  ( ) ( )
if ( ) ( ) and  ( ) ( )
 or  if ( ) ( ) and  ( ) ( ).
R SR SS RS RR
C CC
S SR SS RS RR
C CC
R S SR SS RS RR
CC C C
m cm cm cm cm
m m cm cm cm cm
m m cm cm cm cm
 >≤





     
(15) 
Figure 1 illustrates a case in which 
* R
C m  emerges as the unique equilibrium of the simultaneous 
game.   13 
In sum: Proposition  1  states that any of the two countries can be the equilibrium setter, 
highlighting the fact that assigning ex-ante exclusive power of setting the migration policy to either 
the sending country or to the receiving country, as is often assumed in the received literature, can be 
inappropriate. 
3.3 The sequential game 
We next characterize the equilibrium of the sequential game and identify the country that controls 
migration. We begin by considering the case in which the receiving country moves first and sets its 
optimal policy, anticipating the sending country’s reaction. 
Proposition  2: The equilibrium migration probability, 
* m , of the two-stage game when the 













 <  = 
 

                 
(16) 
Proof: The receiving country R moves first and decides whether to set a migration policy, or to let 
the sending country S set the migration policy. In the latter case, the sending country will clearly 
choose its optimal migration policy 
* S
C m .  If 
* SR
C mm ≤  , then the best strategy  of the receiving 
country is to set its control cost to 0 and to let the sending country choose its own optimal policy 
* S
C m . If 
* SR
C mm >  , the receiving country is better off by setting 
* R
C m  and paying the corresponding 
cost. The sending country accepts  the migration probability proposed by the receiving country 
because 
** R RS S
CC m mm m <<<  . Note that for  )
* 0,
RS
C mm −  ∈  , the sending country will be better off at 
* S
C m . However, it cannot choose a less restrictive migration policy than 
* R
C m , since 
* R
C m  limits the 
choice space of the sending country  
In Figure 1, we illustrate one of the cases listed in Proposition 1, namely, a configuration in 
which 
* RS
C mm <  . In this case, it is easy to see that R can reduce the loss it incurs by setting a more 
restrictive migration policy than that which is optimal for S, even though it has to bear the cost of 
control and therefore 
* R
C m  is the equilibrium.   14 
In Figure 2, we illustrate the case where 
* RS
C mm >  . In this case, R cannot reduce its loss by 
choosing a more restrictive migration policy, and 
* S
C m  emerges as the equilibrium.
19
Consider next the case in which the sending country moves first. 
 
Proposition 3: The equilibrium migration probability, 
* m , of the two-stage game when the sending 




if ( ) or (  and  )
if ( ) or (  and  ).
R S RS RS SR
CC C C
S RS RS S R
CC C C
m m mm mm mm
m
m mm mm mm
−−
−
 ≤≤ < >  = 
><≤  
  
          
(17) 
Proof: Consider the case where the sending country S moves first and decides whether to set a 
migration policy or to let the receiving country set the migration policy. In the latter case, the 
receiving country will clearly choose its optimal migration policy 
* R
C m . If 
* SR S
C mm m − ≤≤  , the best 
strategy of the sending country is to set its control cost to 0, and to let the receiving country choose 
its own optimal policy 
* R
C m . When 
* RS
C mm >  , the sending country is better off by setting 
* S
C m  and 
paying the corresponding cost. The receiving country accepts the migration probability proposed by 
the sending country because 
** S SR R
CC m mm m << <  . When 
* RS
C mm − <  , the sending country is better 
off by setting its optimal policy 
* S
C m . This policy emerges as the equilibrium of the sequential game 
only if the receiving country is willing to accept it, which will be the case when 
* SR
C mm ≤  . When 
* SR
C mm >  , the receiving country sets 
* R
C m , which becomes the equilibrium of the game. 
As in the simultaneous game, both countries can be the equilibrium migration policy setters. 
However, there is no more multiplicity of equilibria because the country that has the first-mover’s 
advantage can avoid ending up in an equilibrium that accords it the lowest level of welfare. 
We now have in place a foundation for analyzing cases in which the migration control cost is 
shared. 
4. Bilateral agreements 
Since the 1990s, there has been a global upsurge in bilateral agreements, as countries have come to 
realize that restricting migration is difficult, and that “cooperative migration management can better 
                                                 
19 The orderings of the m’s is such that in the simultaneous game we have multiple equilibria.   15 
achieve goals for both sending and receiving countries” (ILO, 2004, 15-16).
20
In the preceding section, we considered a non-cooperative setting, and we presented the 
equilibrium migration policy, 
 Bilateral agreements 
often go hand in glove with some burden-sharing between the sending and receiving countries, as 
exemplified by the monitoring of the regulations in the agreements, and by the management of the 
migration process (IOM, 2004).  
* m , which is implemented by the country that consequently incurs the 
associated cost. In this section, we consider two other scenarios. In the first scenario, the country 
that does not set the migration probability can nonetheless influence the equilibrium policy by 
resorting to the device of side-payments. With the solution 
* m  as a starting point, we study the 
possibility of the emergence of bilateral agreements on cost sharing, and we show how they can be 
rationalized. We assume that the possibility of side-payments opens up unexpectedly.
21
* m
  In the 
second scenario, the two countries bargain over both the migration policy and the sharing of the 
costs of implementing the policy. We nest the problem in a Nash bargaining model where the threat 
points of the two countries, should they fail to come to an agreement, are identified by the welfare 
of the representative worker of country R and of the representative worker of country S at  . An 
agreement between the two countries is binding. 
In both scenarios, we consider a specific type of transfer between the countries, say funds for 
border enforcement. 
4.1 Side-payments 
We let the parameter  [ ] 0,1 α ∈  capture the degree of cost-sharing in controlling migration. In the 
presence of a cross-country “subsidization,” the actual per capita control cost for country j,  ()
j cm α , 
when country j sets the equilibrium migration policy, is 
  () ( 1 )() .
jj cm cm α α = −   (18) 
                                                 
20 In the European Union, there is no common migration policy regarding the nationals of non-EU countries, with the 
exceptions of refugees and asylum seekers (cf. the European Refugee Fund) and the intelligence-wise protection of the 
external borders (cf. Frontex). In the Communication of the European Commission (2008), the need for a common, 
comprehensive immigration policy has been recognized, and the basis for this stand has been laid down. Until such time 
that such a policy will be implemented, Member States will continue to resort to individual agreements with one or 
several sending countries. 
21 This assumption guarantees that the simultaneous and the sequential games studied in the preceding section are 
immune to the possibility of potential side-payments. Therefore the outcome 
* m  of the games is a proper starting point 
for our analysis. If side-payments could be anticipated, the optimal strategies of the receiving country and of the 
sending country in the determination of m will take this prospect into account ex ante.   16 
When  0 = α , country j does not receive any side-payment,  () ()
jj cm cm α = , and we are back at the 
case of 
** j
C mm = . For  0 > α , the country which implements its preferred migration policy incurs 
only a fraction (1 ) ( )















α  denotes the per capita side-payment from 
country i to country j. When solving for the optimal migration probability from the perspective of 
country j, an increase in α  is analytically equivalent to a proportional reduction in per capita costs, 
()
j cm . Starting from the case of no transfers, an increase in side-payments between the countries is 
represented by a variation in α . 
Denoting by 
* j mα  the optimal migration policy chosen by country j when a transfer takes place, 
we have the following Proposition. 
Proposition 4. Consider the equilibrium 
** j
C mm =  in the absence of side-payments. An increase in 




















>   (19) 
Proof: See Appendix 3. 
Starting at  0 α = , the left-hand side of (19) captures the marginal benefit to country i. This 
benefit is conferred upon country i by a variation in the optimal policy of country j, in the wake of 
the side-payments that that country receives. The right-hand side represents the (positive) per capita 
marginal cost to country i which arises from the transfer to country j. The proof of Proposition 4 
reveals that starting from 
** j
C mm = , a Pareto improvement can obtain when the marginal benefit of 
changing the migration policy is larger than the marginal cost. 
Consider the case in which S fixes the migration probability at 
** S
C mm =  and incurs all the 







<  always, as can be inferred from equation (18) and 
from the observation of Subsection 3.1 that an increase in α , that is, a decrease in cost, entails a 














< . A   17 
transfer from R to S, which reduces  ()
S cm  to some  ()
S cm α , can be Pareto improving if condition 
(19) holds. 
Thus far, our analysis shows that R can “seduce” S to limit migration: S is willing to trade off a 
more restrictive migration probability for a control cost subsidy, and R is willing to pay such a 
subsidy because the benefit that it stands to reap is larger than the cost that it has to bear. We note 
that if 
R N  is large, side-payments are more likely to increase welfare (cf. equation (19)). 
We consider next the case in which 
** R
C mm = , that is, the case when absent side-payments, the 
equilibrium migration probability is the probability that minimizes the welfare loss of R. In this 















> , which holds when 
** RS
C mm < , the answer is negative: when it comes to 
sharing the migration-control costs, there is no scope for side-payments from S to R. This follows 
from the consideration that when 
** R
C mm =  and  0 α = , an increase in α , that is, a transfer from S to 







< . (We 
recall that if R were to receive a sufficiently large transfer, it would choose 
* 0 m = ). Given that a 
lower migration probability makes S worse off, there is no point for it to incur the transfer. Only 
when 
*** SRS














<  and therefore, S may find it attractive to resort to side-
payments in order to maximize its welfare, provided that condition (19) holds.
22
In sum, bilateral agreements on the sharing of border-control costs can emerge endogenously, 
and can be Pareto-improving. 
 
4.2 A Nash bargaining solution 
We next consider the case in which the two countries can jointly determine the division of the 
enforcement costs and the migration policy in a cooperative way. The objective function is given by 
the product of the utility surplus to country R and to country S from R and S of coming to an 
                                                 
22  Recall that if 
*** SSR
CC mmm <<  then, in the absence of any side-payments,  S  fixes the migration probability at 
** S
C mm = , and we are back in the case that we have already analyzed (cf. the second paragraph that follows equation 
(19)).   18 
agreement, compared to the disagreement point, with each surplus being weighted by the countries’ 
bargaining power. As already noted, the threat points of the two countries, should they fail to come 
to an agreement, are identified by the welfare of the representative worker of country R and of the 
representative worker of country S at 
* m . 
We first consider the case 
** S
C mm = . The maximization problem is 
1 **
0 00 1 , m a x(,) () () ( ) ()( 1 ) () ( ) , R RS S
S
R S RS S S SS
CC R I II I m
N








 Φ = − − −− −  

(20) 
where γ  is the bargaining power of country R, and 1 γ −  is the bargaining power of country S. 








bb RS IIb dG m dG m dC m
NN
dm dm dm
== + −=   (21) 
 
** * * * *
0 0 11 ()( 1 ) () ( ) () ( ) , RR SS
S RR R S SS S S
bb b C b C I I II C m N GmGm N GmGm αγ γ
= = ==   = − −− −     (22) 
where b denotes the bargaining solution, and where we make use of  () ()
S SS C m Nc m = . 
Equation (21) implicitly defines the optimal migration policy 
*
b m . At 
* S
C m , the left-hand side of 
equation (21) is negative.
23 ** S
bC mm <  Consequently,  . Starting from the outside option 
* S
C m , it is 
optimal to decrease the migration probability as long as the total marginal benefit to country R 
outweighs the sum of the total marginal loss to country S and the marginal increase in the total costs 
of control. 
Equation (22) identifies the optimal transfer 
** ()
S
bb Cm α   from country R  to country S.  The 
transfer of resources from country R to country S increases in the surplus from bargaining reaped by 
country R, that is, in 
**
00 () ( )0 RR
R RS
bC II GmGm
== −> , and in the bargaining power of country S. Given 
that by moving from 
* S
C m  in the direction of a lower migration probability 
*
b m  the sending country 
                                                 
23 This result obtains since 
* S
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= −=  (cf. 






C R I dG m
N
dm
= <  given that 
* S
C m
 is on the declining 






  curve.    19 
incurs a welfare loss, we have that 
**
11 () ( )0 SS
S SS
bC II GmGm
== −< . The higher the loss, the higher must 
be the transfer from country R to country S. 
Alternatively, we consider the case 
* * R








bb RS IIb dG m dG m dC m
NN
dm dm dm
== + −=   (23) 
 
** * * * *
00 11 () () ( ) ( 1 ) () ( ) . S S RR
R SS S R RR R R
bb b C b C II II C m N GmGm N GmGm αγ γ
== ==   =− −− −       (24) 
The interpretation of equations (23) and (24) is akin to the interpretation pertaining to the case in 
which 
** S
C mm = . In the current case as well, there is room for implementing a joint cost-sharing and 




 The only 
difference is the possibility that a less restrictive migration policy emerges as the equilibrium 
outcome of the bargaining game. Indeed at  , equation (23) is positive if 
** RS
C mm < , in which 
case 
** R
bC mm > . 
When an endogenous formation of bilateral agreements is in evidence, it could serve as an 
indication that in order to secure welfare gains to both the  receiving  country and the sending 
country, the two countries are willing to make concessions in the form of policy adjustments.  
5. A comment on welfare 
In this section we ask whether the prevalence of a welfare gain to S, brought about by the prospect 
of migration as claimed by recent research of Stark and Wang (2002), Fan and Stark (2007a, 
2007b), and Sorger, Stark, and Wang (2011) holds in a setting in which controlling migration is 
costly, and in which both S and R wield power to set the migration policy. 
To this end, we have the following Corollary. 
Corollary 1: With 
* m , there is a welfare gain for the sending country as compared to the closed-
economy setting, and the receiving country minimizes its welfare loss. 
                                                 
24 In a dynamic set-up, that 
*
b m  constitutes a Pareto improvement for both countries would provide a rationale for the 
countries not to deviate from the static Nash bargaining solution that we have presented.   20 
If 
** S
C mm = ,  S  certainly gains in comparison with the closed economy setting due to the 
increase in its average level of human capital which is triggered by the prospect of migration. When 
** R
C mm = , we have to distinguish between the simultaneous game and the sequential game. In the 
case of a simultaneous game, for the equilibrium migration policy to be 
* R
C m , it has to hold that 
* SR
C mm ≥  , which secures a welfare gain for the sending country. In the case of a sequential game 
when R moves first, 
** R
C mm =  requires 
* RS
C mm <  , which guarantees that 
* RS
C mm <  . This inequality 
is fulfilled also when S moves first (cf. Proposition 3). Therefore, country S experiences a welfare 
improvement even when R sets the equilibrium policy. 
The result of a welfare gain for the sending country holds a fortiori when 
** j mm α = , that is if 
side-payments are operative.  
When with Nash bargaining 
**
b mm = , both countries are not worse off than at 
**  or 
SR
CC mm . 
Having established that country S experiences a welfare gain at 
**  and 
SR
CC mm , S stands to enjoy a 
welfare gain much more so when 
**
b mm = . 
6. Conclusions 
We have shown how migration restrictions can arise in a non-cooperative framework, and that both 
the receiving country and the sending country can be the setters of the equilibrium policy. The 
observation that most migration restrictions are imposed by receiving countries can be rationalized 
within our model when we admit that the receiving country prefers levels of migration that are 
lower than those preferred by the sending country. This does not imply that the conduct of the 
sending country is immaterial: its actions constrain the actions of the receiving country. We have 
also identified instances in which bilateral agreements can arise as welfare-improving devices. We 
considered two cases: an agreement on side-payments, and a joint agreement on the migration 
policy and the cost-sharing of its implementation. Our analytical findings align with the observation 
that bilateral agreements often go hand in glove with some burden-sharing between the sending and 
receiving countries. 
We have expanded the analysis of Stark and Wang (2002) to a setting in which the receiving 
country plays an active role in the determination of the migration policy, yet the implementation of 
the policy involves a cost. We have shown that even in such a setting, the sending country can still   21 
stand to benefit from its workers’ decisions to acquire human capital in the presence of a prospect 
of migration. For the sending country alone to decide its migration policy (probability) is a 
sufficient condition for it to reap a welfare gain but, as we have shown, this is not a necessary 
condition. A welfare gain can be obtained by the sending country in a more realistic setting where 
the migration restrictions are set non-cooperatively in a game that allows both countries to have a 
say in the choice of the migration policy. More so if we allow for some degree of cooperation 
between the two countries. 
 
Appendix 1 
We consider a setup that differs from the one in the main text of the paper in that in terms of innate 
ability, the workers in each country are heterogeneous. For simplicity, we assume that there are two 
types of workers  both in S  and in R,  and that  they are  equally represented in the  S  and  R 
populations.
25
i k  We denote by   the cost of forming human capital by worker i,  1, 2 i = , and we 
assume that  12 kk < . Because we analyze a setting of quotas, we retain the assumption that the 
probability to migrate is the same for the two types of workers. 
For a native S country worker i, the objective function (2) is 
  { } { } ( ) ln( 1) ln( 1) (1 ) ln( 1) ln( 1) .
S S mR S R S S S S
i i i i ii Wm m k ϑ β ϑ ηϑ β ϑ ηϑ ϑ = ++ + +− ++ + −   (A.1) 
Differentiating (A.1) with respect to 
S
















=−   (A.2) 
Referring next to R, the objective function of an R country worker i is 
  ( ) ln( 1) ln( 1)
RR R R R R
i i i ii Wk ϑ β ϑ ηϑ ϑ  = ++ + −  ,  (A.3) 
and his optimal level of human capital is 
                                                 
25 We could just as well assume that the share of workers of one type is γ and the share of workers of the other type is 
1 γ − . 
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ϑ = − .  (A.4) 
As in the case of a homogeneous workforce, we have that 
** SR
ii ϑϑ < .
27
The wellbeing of a non-migrant worker i in country S and of a native worker in country R can 
be written as net earnings minus the per capita control cost 
 
 
* ** ln( 1) ln( 1) ( ) ,
j j j jj j
i ii k c mI β ϑ ηϑ ϑ ++ +− −   (A.5) 
evaluated at the optimal level of investment in human capital, 
* j
i ϑ .  Net earnings are  used  to 
formulate the two countries’ objective functions, which we denote by  j
j
I G . 
Looking first at country S, the objective function  S
S
I G  is  
* ** **
11 1 22 2
11
( ) ln( 1) ln( 1) ln( 1) ( )
22
S
S S SS S SS S SS
I G m k k c mI βϑ ϑ βϑ ϑ η ϑ    = +− + +− + +−    .  (A.6) 
From (A.6) and (A.2), the objective function of country S can be rewritten as 
12
12
1 () 1 () ()
( ) ln ln 1
22
11 1
ln ( ) ( )
2
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mR S S mR S S mR S S
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= , and where we have substituted 
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
.  (A.8) 
Differentiating (A.7) with respect to m yields 
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 = − −−
−+  
 
This expression is the same as equation (8) in the main text. 
Regarding R, its objective function  R
R
I G  is  
                                                 
27 As in the main text, we drop the argument in 
*()
S m ϑ  and 
*()
S m ϑ when doing so causes no confusion.    23 
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m= ϑ  denotes the average level of human capital of the native workers in R. 



















  (A.11) 




















,  (A.12) 
an expression that is akin to equation (11) in the main text. 
Appendix 2 
For the purpose of graphical representation, we make the following parameter assumptions: 
1 ,  4,  2, 0.2, 0.4,  1











where  05 . 0 ˆ =
j C  and a is an even number. We recall that 
0(0) j jj
j jj
I II G GG
= = −  is a normalization 
that we use to graphically represent the objective functions. 
Varying the speed at which costs decrease as measured by a, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate two 
different cases: the curves in Figure 1 are drawn for  14 = a , and in Figure 2 they are drawn for 
12 = a .  
In both Figures, the chosen parameters guarantee that 
* R
C m  is a global maximum. 
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Appendix 3 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Control costs  ) ( ) ( m c m c







< , as can be 
inferred from (18) in conjunction with our observations in Subsection 3.1. 
Two effects are at work for country i,  which  contemplates transferring side-payments to 
country j. The country’s natives experience an increase in per capita costs due to the transfer. This 
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In this case, the total effect for country i is positive if the increase in per capita welfare exceeds the 



















































< . Paying transfers to achieve a lower migration probability can then never 
be optimal.    25 
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